Abstract-This paper presents and model a novel general framework for privacy aware collaborative information sharing for data analysis. Collaborative information sharing systems can be cross-domain, involve different data providers which might also be competitors. For this reason, shared information may imply privacy concerns, which must be addressed, applying privacy preserving mechanisms on information before sharing them. However, since the application of these privacy preserving mechanisms may negatively affect the accuracy of data analysis, a trade-off must be considered, and the privacy preserving mechanism to be applied must be chosen correctly. The proposed framework is based on the separation between a first level which enforces information privacy as specified by data providers, and a second level which performs data analysis on the sanitized data. The proposed framework defines and models a workflow which applies to any privacy aware collaborative information sharing system, defines indexes to measure the compatibility between privacy requirements, and includes a novel method to compute the trade-off between privacy and accuracy. This work also proposes a methodology to choose, case-by-case, the privacy mechanism which maximizes the trade-off between privacy and accuracy. An applicative example on a real dataset with more than 30k records is also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Facing the new challenges brought by a continuous evolving Information Technologies (IT) market, large companies and small-to-medium enterprises found in Information Sharing a valid instrument to improve their key performance indexes. Sharing data with partners, authorities for data collection and even competitors, may help in inferring additional intelligence through collaborative information analysis. Such an intelligence could be exploited to improve revenues, e.g. through best practice sharing [1] , market basket analysis [2] , or prevent loss coming from brand-new potential cyber-threats [3] . Other applications include analysis of medical data, provided by several hospitals and health centers for statistical analysis on patient records, useful, for example, to shape the causes and symptoms related to a new pathology [4] . Among the others, usage of collaborative information sharing system for early detection and prevention of cyber attacks is receiving raising attention in the last years [5] . An attempt to automate the procedure of information sharing concerning cyber-threats and fostering the adoption of adequate countermeasures has been done. An example is embodied by CERTs (Computer Emergency Response Teams), governmental or private organizations that collect and make publicly available information about known cyber attacks, collaboratively shared by various stakeholders, with best practices to avoid such known threats. Moreover, through information analysis techniques, it is possible to detect intrusion attempts at run time and even new threats, known as Zero-Day attacks.
Independently from the final goal, unfortunately information sharing brings issues and drawbacks which must be addressed. These issues are mainly related to the information privacy. Shared information might be sensitive, potentially harming the privacy of physical persons, such as employee records for business applications, or patient records for medical ones. Hence, an information analysis framework must also include a set of mechanisms to ensure confidentiality and privacy of shared information.
Some work has already been done in this direction, proposing frameworks for collaborative data analysis in different environments [6] , also with the application of specific privacy preserving mechanisms [7] . However, the proposed frameworks are still very focused on specific applications, i.e. are designed to analyze specific information formats, with specific analysis algorithms, only compliant with specific privacy preserving mechanisms. Lacking in portability, these approaches force the redefinition of a new framework and workflow model for different collaborative analysis applications. To the best of our knowledge, the model for a portable general framework for security-aware collaborative information sharing is still missing. Such a model should be applicable in different environments, on different data types, with different privacy and trust implications. Moreover, it is desirable that such a model provides the instruments to quantitatively measure ensured privacy and analysis accuracy for provided algorithms.
In this paper, we introduce the model of a general security aware information sharing framework, which aims at generalizing the logical interaction between the typical actors of any information sharing system. The proposed model is based on a crisp separation between three logical components, i.e. i) the set of data providers and consumers (prosumers); ii) an Information Sharing Infrastructure (ISI) which handles the secure information sharing in respect of privacy policies specified by the prosumers, applying privacy preserving mechanisms (e.g. encryption, generalization, etc.) on shared information; and iii) a detached Information Analysis Infrastructure (IAI), which performs statistical analysis and data mining on the information processed by ISI (sanitized information). Afterward, we provide a formal definition for prosumers privacy requirements, modeling their possible relations and compatibility, also providing a measure on how they affect results accuracy. Finally we propose a methodology, based on the aforementioned measures, to find the best trade-off between accuracy and privacy in a collaborative analysis, respecting the prosumers' privacy requirements. This methodology computes the best trade-off without information content disclosure.
The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose the model of a novel general framework for multi-party collaborative privacy preserving information sharing and analysis.
• We present in detail and formalize the aforementioned model, which is based on the logical distinction between three layers, namely the information prosumers sharing data and defining Data Sharing Agreements (DSA), an Information Sharing Infrastructure offering and enforcing privacy preserving mechanisms, and an Information Analysis Infrastructure for extracting additional intelligence from data.
• We provide a formal model for the framework workflow and we introduce the concepts of privacy gain and data utility loss, used to model the trade-off between required privacy and analysis accuracy.
• We introduce the concept of Data Sharing Agreement compatibility, to model relations between data usage policies of different prosumers.
• We propose the compatibility matrix as the main tool of a novel methodology to automatically select the privacy preserving mechanism, which yields the best trade-off between accuracy and ensured privacy, according to prosumers DSA specifications and analysis to be performed. We prove formally the soundness of the proposed methodology and we show how data disclosure is not required by such a calculation.
• Finally we present an application of the proposed methodology on a standard dataset with about 30k records.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, a description of the reference architecture is presented. Figure 1 shows a high level representation of such an architecture, showing the main elements and their interactions. The main actors of the system are a set of Information Prosumers (producers-consumers), which are willing to collaboratively share information sets, to receive additional intelligence inferred through collaborative data analysis. Information is shared in form of datasets, coming with security policies attached on them in the form of Data Sharing Agreement (DSA). Information sharing and information analysis phases are managed by two detached logical components named Information Sharing Infrastructure (ISI) and Information Analysis Infrastructure (IAI), respectively. The ISI handles the process of sharing information in a secure way, ensuring data isolation and applying privacy preserving mechanisms on dataset, producing sanitized datasets. The IAI receives processed information from the ISI and extracts intelligence through data mining and information analysis techniques.
Each shared dataset is associated to a Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) which specifies the sharing rules for the associated dataset that the prosumer wants to be applied. In particular, we assume the DSA to contain a set of privacy rules prosumers want to be enforced on the dataset(s) they share. Enforcement of DSAs rules is controlled by Information Sharing Infrastructure (see Figure 1 ). The ISI is considered a trusted component, which follows the instruction specified in the DSA for each dataset, avoiding the distribution of sensitive information to unauthorized parties. We assume the ISI to be protected from tampering, man in the middle and other kind of external attacks. As shown in Figure 1 ISI processes each dataset separately, i.e. it is not able to combine datasets coming from different prosumers. Finally, the Information Analysis Infrastructure (IAI in Figure 1 ) applies the requested analysis functions, returning the inferred intelligence to requesting prosumers. Differently from the ISI, the IAI is not a trusted component, thus sensitive information which a prosumer wish to be kept private, should be shared with IAI only after ISI has processed them to enforce the privacy requirements specified in the DSA.
The proposed logical framework is suitable to represent several different physical architectural models, spanning from a totally centralized system, to a pure Peer-to-Peer (P2P) one. We report in more details here these two dual examples.
In the first example we consider a total centralized architec- Figure 2 , where dislocated prosumers asks to a central server to perform data analysis. In this architecture, ISI and IAI are both embodied by the central server, whilst prosumers are clients which share a secure connection (wired, TLS, etc...) with the server. Information in the form of datasets is sent with DSA to the server. Hence, the server will enforce DSAs-specified privacy preserving mechanisms, and performs information analysis on the sanitized dataset. It is worth noting that, in this hypothesis the server should be totally trusted, since it directly receives the plain data, hence information is disclosed to the framework administrator. Still, privacy preserving mechanisms are applied on data, since results of collaborative analysis may contain privacy sensitive information that a prosumer does not want to be shared with others, different from the central server. Another centralized model, which removes the hypothesis of trust on the central server, is the one in which ISI is implemented directly on the prosumer's side. In this case prosumers will provide dataset already sanitized and the server will only perform data analysis (IAI) on the sanitized datasets. The dual example is the one of a totally P2P architecture, where analysis computation load is shared between all the prosumers for each operation. In this architecture, the role divisions is just logical, since all prosumers also include ISI and IAI as shown in Figure 3 . To preserve privacy, in this architecture information is shared and analysis is performed by mean of secure multi-party computation algorithms, mainly based on homomorphic encryption, which allows data to be processed without disclosing the contained information. Summarizing, the ISI is a trusted component which offers and implements a set of privacy preserving mechanisms to be applied on data. It can be centralized or distributed, still always preserve information isolation, never mixing or processing more than one dataset at a time for each operation. On the other hand, the IAI is a component not trusted, which should not receive directly plain information from prosumers, still implements the provided algorithms for collaborative data analysis. 
A. Workflow description
For the proposed framework, we envision the following general workflow.
1) An information prosumer IP i asks the system for a specific analysis function λ to be performed on a dataset. The analysis operation request is issued by a single prosumer at a time, and evaded before others are issued.
The request also contains a dataset D i , to specify the data format, including records, on which the requested analysis should be performed. 2) Each prosumer sends to ISI a bundle containing a dataset in the same format of D i and the associated DSA.
3) The ISI, considering the DSA of each dataset and the requested analysis operation, computes for each dataset and for each specified privacy preserving mechanism a trade-off score (as detailed in Section III-B) between the privacy and accuracy. 4) The ISI selects the privacy preserving mechanism γ yielding the best trade-off score and satisfying the largest amount of DSAs, in order to increase the amount of used datasets. To this end a global trade-off score is computed in order to maximize both the single trade-off scores and the number of used datasets. The datasets with non compliant DSAs are discarded. 5) The ISI applies γ on the datasets which are not discarded and sends them to the IAI, which will perform the analysis, returning the result to IP i .
III. FRAMEWORK MODELING
In this section we will formally describe the framework operational workflow, presenting the concepts and measures to quantify data privacy and accuracy loss.
A. Concepts and Measures

1) Datasets Format:
An ordered set of k attributes, named 
The set of all possible records is shown with 2) Privacy Mechanism: A privacy mechanism is an operation which guarantees the privacy requirements specified by a prosumer. The set of all privacy mechanisms provided by the system is represented as Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 ,...,γ n Γ }. Enforcing the privacy mechanism γ on the dataset D, it is denoted by γ(D), i.e. γ(D) is the sanitized form of the dataset D.
3) Privacy Gain: Data privacy is quantified as the degree of uncertainty that the original data can be inferred from the sanitized one [8] . In order to numerically quantify such a degree of uncertainty we define the privacy gain obtained by applying the privacy mechanism γ on the dataset D as:
where d γ returns the difference of the degree of the uncertainty between the main dataset (D) and its sanitized form γ(D). In present work, we consider those privacy mechanisms for which it can be defined a privacy gain returning a real number, normalized to the interval (0,1], where 1 represents that the maximum amount of privacy gain has been achieved. A general metric for computing privacy gain on data is based on the difference of information entropy [9] between the original dataset and sanitized one.
4) Data Utility Loss:
The enforcement of a privacy mechanism on a dataset may affect the accuracy of the analysis function result. In fact, a sanitized dataset may carry information in an altered way w.r.t. the original dataset, and such alteration might change the outcome of the analysis. We call the amount of information which is lost by enforcing a privacy mechanism as data utility loss. This amount depends from the privacy mechanism enforced on the original dataset and from the analysis function desired for this dataset. As an example, let's consider a dataset where each record contains information about a patient, including the exact age and the disease. Supposing the prosumer's DSA for this dataset requires the age to be generalized in the range of 5 years, the sanitized form will be less precise. This reduced precision may affect, for example, the results of geometrical distance-based analysis algorithms such as clustering. Still, such an alteration may not reduce the precision of another analysis algorithm, which is designed to work on categorical data, such as some kind of classification algorithms.
Data utility loss is defined as follows: Let's consider the dataset D, its sanitized form γ(D), and the desired analysis function λ. Hence, data utility loss is defined as:
where d λ (D , γ(D)) measures the amount of information loss for dataset D when the privacy mechanism γ is applied on it, if the analysis function λ is requested.
A typical metric which can be used to represent such a distance consists of calculating how many elements of the original dataset became indistinguishable after sanitation [10] , which is representative of the reduced specificity of the sanitized dataset. Another methodology [11] is based on computing differences, such as the Kullback-Leibler, for the probability distributions represented in a dataset, in order to quantify the deviation of the sanitized dataset from the original one.
5) Trade-off Score: As previously discussed, applying a privacy mechanism on a dataset improves the privacy gain of the sanitized dataset, whilst on the other hand it may reduce the data utility. We define a trade-off score as the output of a function of privacy gain and utility loss, in a way that the trade-off score increases when privacy gain is maximized and data utility loss is minimized. Given the dataset D, the privacy mechanism γ, and the analysis function λ, we denote the tradeoff score as τ (ρ(D, γ), α(D, γ, λ).
Several functions and optimization models match the aforementioned definition and can be used according to the preferences of the specific system implementation. In particular it is possible to use the trade-off score functions where privacy gain and utility loss have the same impact on the result, otherwise it is possible to give different weights to the two values. A simple expression matching these properties, which gives the same weight to privacy gain and data utility loss is the following:
a) Average Trade-off Score: As discussed, the trade-off score is computed on a single dataset for a single privacy preserving mechanism. In order to find the best trade-off considering the DSAs of several prosumers, an average tradeoff score is defined. Lets consider m datasets {D 1 , D 2 ,. ..,D m }, a privacy mechanism γ, and an analysis function λ, are given. Then, the trade-off score on the given elements is defined as:
and |.| returns the number of elements in a dataset.
6) DSA Properties: Data Sharing Agreements (DSA)s are formal agreements which regulate how parties share data, enabling the secure, controlled, and collaborative data exchange [12] . Privacy policies are expressed through rules in a human readable language (such as CNL [13] ), still automatically processable. Each rule corresponds to one or more privacy mechanisms to be applied. More precisely, since prosumers are considered non-expert parties, a set of m ∈ N easy understanding human readable privacy rules, named R = {r 1 , r 2 ,...,r m }, is provided by the system. Each DSA ⊆ R can be guaranteed by at least one privacy mechanism γ j from the set of all privacy mechanisms Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 ,...,γ n Γ }, provided by the system. Hence, the privacy requirements specified in a DSA is compiled with at least one privacy mechanism proposed by the system. We formally define the binary DSA satisfiability function, denoted as |=, which gets a pair containing a privacy mechanism from Γ and a DSA from the set of all provided DSAs D, i.e. |=: Γ × D → {True, False}; it returns True and False as follows:
in the case that |= (γ j , DSA i ) returns True, for the sake of simplicity, we use the alternative representation γ j |= DSA i . Hence, the following relation is satisfied:
The set of privacy mechanisms which guarantee the privacy requirements of DSA i is denoted as
where l i denotes the number of privacy mechanisms that guarantee the privacy requirements of DSA i requested by IP i . Formally, for any γ j ∈ Γ (1 ≤ j ≤ n Γ ), we have:
The DSA format and the rule representation is not in the scope of this paper. However, interested reader may refer to [13] , and [14] .
7) DSAs Compatibility:
Let the set of required data sharing agreements in the system is given as D = {DSA 1 , DSA 2 ,...,DSA n }. We say DSA i (∈ D) and DSA j (∈ D) are compatible, denoted as DSA i ∼ DSA j , if there exists at least one privacy mechanism which guarantees the privacy requirements of both. Formally,
, where Γ i is the set of privacy mechanisms that guarantee DSA i . This operator can be generalized to a set of DSAs. In fact, the k data sharing agreements, without loss of generality denoted as DSA 1 , DSA 2 ,...,DSA k , are compatible, if there exists at least one privacy mechanism which guarantee all of them. Formally, we have: 
B. Privacy Mechanism Selection
Building on the concepts and notions defined in the previous subsection, it is now possible to define the methodology to choose the privacy mechanism yielding the best trade-off.
As discussed, the framework provides: (i) A set of privacy rules, i.e. privacy requirements R = {r 1 , r 2 ,...,r n R } in a human readable language, (ii) an associated set of privacy mechanisms Γ = {γ 1 , γ 2 ,...,γ n Γ }, where for each rule, or set of rules of R there exists at least one privacy mechanism to guarantee it, (iii) a measure associated to each privacy mechanism γ ∈ Γ to quantify the amount of privacy gain applying γ on dataset D, denoted as ρ(D, γ), (iv) A set of analysis functions Λ = {λ 1 , λ 2 ,...,λ n Λ }, and (v) a data utility loss measurement α(D, γ, λ) associated to each dataset D, privacy mechanism γ ∈ Γ, and analysis function λ ∈ Λ. At each step, one prosumer, say IP x , specifies that it is interested in the result of an analysis function λ t ∈ Λ x . At this step, ISI looks for the privacy mechanism in Γ x returning the best average trade-off score for λ t . In fact, we recall that a DSA can be satisfied by several privacy mechanisms. Hence, every applicable privacy mechanism γ j ∈ Γ x (1 ≤ j ≤ l x ) is enforced on every dataset D i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) for which γ j |= DSA i , computing thus the trade-off scores.
These trade-off scores can be represented by mean of an n×l x matrix which we name compatibility matrix. The element of the i'th row and the j'th column of the compatibility matrix reports the trade-off score computed applying j'th privacy mechanism in Γ x on D i for the analysis function λ t , if γ j |= D i . If γ j is not applicable on D i since does not match DSA i , the corresponding element in the matrix is put to 0. Formally, the elements of the compatibility matrix are defined as follows:
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ l x . The resulting matrix, denoted as M Γ x ,λ t , can be written as:
The compatibility matrix is exploited to compute the average trade-off score dependent to each privacy mechanism γ x j and analysis function λ t , as the weighted average of the non zero elements of the j'th column.
To formally express the set of datasets on which the average trade-off score should be computed for each privacy mechanism γ x j ∈ Γ x , we define the following projection function, denoted as ψ γ x j ,λ t . We recall that, in fact, the average tradeoff score does not consider the elements in the compatibility matrix equal to 0. Hence, ψ γ x j ,λ t projects the input set of datasets to one of its subset, such that for each dataset in the output the trade-off score is not zero. Formally:
Thus, with the use of projection function we compute the trade-off score of each privacy mechanism γ x j ∈ Γ x as follows:
where the average trade-off score is computed from III-A5a. Afterward, we select the best privacy mechanism γ * which guarantees DSA x and returns the best average trade-off score for all the provided datasets:
However, it is possible that applying the mechanisms of Γ x on D x only, it results a trade-off score higher than γ * . To this end, we select the best trade-off score from x'th row as follows:
Then ISI selects between γ * and γ * x , the one which returns the highest trade-off score on the associated dataset(s). Proof. The proof is resulted from the fact that in the worst case that there is no data sharing agreement compatible to DSA x to improve the trade-off score, the system returns the result of applying λ t on sanitized form of D x through the best privacy mechanism of Γ x .
Theorem III.2. Applying the same notions introduced in III-B, the compatibility matrix M Γ x ,λ t respects the following properties:
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
To give an additional insight on the proposed framework, in this section we discuss an applicative example in a plausible scenario, focusing on the action and interaction of ISI and IAI, and on the computation of privacy gain and data utility loss. The envisioned application is based on a set of prosumers, which are different and eventually competitor enterprises. Such enterprises share with different privacy requirements the dataset with personal and retributive information of their employee, using the proposed framework to infer additional intelligence. In this example the employee dataset is embodied by the Adult repository [15] , which contains the attributes and values shown in Table I , where the Income attribute represents the class label. To simplify the metrics calculation, a subset of the original Adult dataset attributes is considered. 
Marital Status
Married-civ-spouse, Divorced, Never-married, Separated, Widowed, Married-spouse-abs, Married-AF-spouse
Race
White
Work Class
Private, Self-emp-not-inc, Self-emp-inc, Federal-gov, Local-gov, State-gov, Without-pay, Never-worked
Education
Bachelor, Some-college, 11th, HS-grad, Prof-school, Assoc-acdm, Assoc-voc, 9th, 7th-8th, 12th, Masters, 1st-4th, 10th, Doctorate, 5th-6th, Preschool
Occupation
Tech-supp, Craft-repair, Other-service, Sales, Exe-manager, Prof-special, Handler-cleaner, Machine-op-inspct, Adm-clerical, Farm-fish, Transport-moving, Priv-house-serv, Protective-serv, Armed-Force Income {≤ 50k}, {> 50k}
Due to different kinds of agreements with the employee and for the possible competitive nature of the companies, datasets are shared after sanitation, which match various privacy requirements. To this end, the framework offers to each prosumer a set of human readable privacy rules to create DSAs. Each rule has an associated privacy mechanism which can be applied by the ISI. The set of privacy rules and the associated privacy mechanism for this example is shown in Table II . The resulting set of all privacy mechanisms for this example can be written as:
refers to the power set of the privacy mechanisms. In this case, whenever a set contains more than one privacy mechanism, it refers to a privacy mechanism which addresses all the associated privacy requirements. Hence, the associated privacy mechanisms are as follows:
IP 3 issues an analysis request, looking for a predictor to extract information pattern of those persons earning more than 50k per year (in the adult dataset, the class-label is known). Hence, the system provides λ 1 , which will use the received dataset(s) to train a decision tree classifier (C4.5) to predict if a person earns more than 50k. Given DSA 3 and Γ 3 , from the definition of privacy mechanism comparison, discussed in Section III-A8, it is possible to conclude that γ 2 γ 4 and γ 5 γ 4 . Hence, γ 4 replaces γ 2 and γ 5 in any combination. Consequently, the remaining combinations to be analyzed are the following four:
In this specific case, considering the dataset format and the requested analysis algorithm, which is a classification on a categorical dataset, the system computes the privacy gain associated to each privacy mechanism of γ ∈ Γ 3 as follows:
where v s is the number of possible values for the s'th attribute, p(x ks ) and p (x ks ) denote the number of records that respects k'th value of s'th attribute divided to the number of records in the original dataset D and the sanitized dataset γ(D) respectively. M D denotes the maximum amount of entropy of dataset D, which is achieved when the values of each attribute are equally distributed [8] .
To compute data utility loss, the system provides a generalization-based utility metric specific for classification [10] , which is detailed in the following. Given a dataset D containing N records, two records are said to belong to the same group if they have the same attribute values. After generalization, which basically conveys different values to a single one, more elements will be likely to fall in the same group. If due to generalization, two or more elements of different classes fall in the same group, there is a reduction of the data utility. Hence, a penalty is attributed to each record falling into a group where the majority class label is different from its own. The penalty of the record d i is equal to 1, if its class label is not the majority class label of its group. Otherwise, the penalty of the record d i is equal to 0. The data utility loss for any privacy mechanism in our system, and the analysis function λ 1 , is computed as follows:
where N is the total number of records in the dataset. In this example, we use the following relation for computing the trade-off score, already introduced in Section III-B:
Computing the trade-off score for each dataset and for each privacy mechanism in Γ 3 (IP 3 is the prosumer requesting the analysis), the following 3 × 4 compatibility matrix is obtained: We recall that the trade-off score is 0 for the elements whose privacy mechanisms do not guarantee the DSA of the corresponding dataset. We compute the average trade-off score for each γ j ∈ Γ 3 as follows. From the compatibility matrix we can see that the best trade-off scores are in the last column, i.e. when {γ 1 , γ 3 , γ 4 } are applied on datasets. In fact, the last column is the one ensuring the highest level of privacy, with respect to the other combinations of Γ 3 , hence the one which maximizes the privacy gain. However, it is worth noting that the trade-off score difference between {γ 1 , γ 3 , γ 4 } and {γ 1 , γ 4 } is not considerably high. It can be inferred that the generalization of the race attribute does not strongly affect the data utility, still brings a considerable benefit to the privacy gain. From the compatibility matrix, the average trade-off scores are computed for each column as follows:
These results confirm the previous analysis on the compatibility matrix, where the privacy mechanism set γ * = {γ 1 , γ 3 , γ 4 }, noticeably returns the best score. On the other hand, applying Γ 3 on D 3 only, the best trade-off score will be the highest value in the third row, i.e. 0.3170(< 0.3177). Thus, the ISI will apply γ * = {γ 1 , γ 3 , γ 4 } on the three datasets and will send the sanitized datasets to the IAI. Hence IAI will train a C4.5 classifier with the received datasets and will return it to IP 3 .
V. RELATED WORK
In this section we will report some significant works on privacy-aware collaborative data mining. As previously discussed, these works are application specific, focusing on specific implementations both for data analysis and for privacy preserving mechanisms. Our framework addresses this lack of generality, proposing a model which aims at being applicable in different applications, being general on the side of usable privacy preserving mechanisms and data analysis algorithms.
A study of efficient solutions to the problem of knowledge extraction among multiple parties involved in a data mining task is presented in [16] . The studied methodology aims at performing data mining without data disclosure between the parties. This methodology relies on homomorphic encryption and digital envelope techniques. These techniques suffer from the drawback of being applicable to only a small set of data analysis functions. Also they impose a considerable overhead. A work focusing on a single privacy preserving data mining algorithm is presented in [6] . The presented approach is only valid for the association rule mining analysis technique. This work considers the trade off between privacy and overall accuracy, still, being specific for a single privacy preserving mechanism, it lacks in generality. Moreover, collaboration is not considered. Other similar work, focused on the concept of privacy preserving data mining, still missing generality and not considering collaboration are the ones presented in [17] and [18] . The framework proposed in [7] describes an approach to securely unify information, sanitized through geometric perturbations. Being designed for geometric perturbation only, this framework imposes limits not only on applicable privacy preserving mechanisms and analysis algorithms; in fact, it also imposes limits on data format, since geometric perturbation is only applicable to numeric data. The concept of data utility has been partially explored in Fung et. al. [19] , which presents a study to summarize and evaluate different approaches to privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP). However, this work does not consider different data analysis algorithms, nor aspects of collaboration.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Having a general model for collaborative information analysis systems, enables a common representation for any framework and specific application where a set of prosumers share information to receive additional intelligence. In this paper we have presented a general framework for privacy preserving collaborative information analysis, based on the logical separation between a layer to ensure data privacy, and a layer to perform analysis on sanitized information. The proposed model includes the definition of measures and indexes, such as privacy gain and data utility loss, which can be used to estimate the framework performance in any applicative environment, independently from the physical framework configuration. Furthermore, we propose a compatibility matrix as a tool which allows automatic computation of the best tradeoff between information privacy and result accuracy.
In future work we plan to apply the proposed model to represent collaborative information sharing framework in different environment, such as medical (e-Health) environment for secure patient record sharing between different hospital, and industrial multi-company environment for automatic early detection of intrusion and general cyber-security threats. This will allow the selection or definition of specific metrics for privacy gain and data utility loss, as well as to provide a testbed to prove the real effectiveness of the proposed model.
